Michigan Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 4

1953

CIVIL PROCEDURE-RIGHT OF IMPLEADER UNDER MICHIGAN
CONTRIBUTION STATUTE
W. J. Roper
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
W. J. Roper, CIVIL PROCEDURE-RIGHT OF IMPLEADER UNDER MICHIGAN CONTRIBUTION STATUTE, 51
MICH. L. REV. 590 (1953).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol51/iss4/11

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

590

MicmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 51

CIVIL PROCEDURE-RIGHT OF l:MPLEADER UNDER MICHIGAN CONTRIBUTION

STATUTE-Plaintiff, a resident of of Michigan, brought a negligence action
against defendant, an Illinois corporation, for personal injury in the Federal District Court fpr the Eastern District of Michigan. The defendant moved to implead a citizen of Michigan and a Michigan corporation as third party defendants on the theory that under the Michigan Contribution Statute1 as concurrent
tortfeasors they would be liable to him for part of the judgment in the event
that plaintiff recovered in the suit. The court granted the motion and the
defendant filed its third party complaint. Plaintiff then moved to dismiss the

122 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1935) §27.1683. "Section 1. Whenever a money judgment
has been recovered jointly against 2 or more defendants in an action for bodily injury or
death resulting therefrom, or property damage, and such judgment has been paid in part
or in full by 1 or more of such defendants, each defendant who has paid more than his pro
rata share shall be entitled to contribution with respect to the excess so paid over and above
the pro rata share of the defendants making such payments. • • ."
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third party complaint. Held: motion granted. The court reasoned that since
the Michigan Contribution Statute was almost identical with that of New York
and since the Michigan Supreme Court has never passed upon the right of impleader under it, the New York court's interpretation2 of their statute denying
impleader should govern. Buckner v. Foster (McLouth Steel Corp., ThirdParty Defendants), (D.C. Mich. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 279.
At common law there was no right of contribution among tortfeasors.
Many states have, however, passed a variety of statutes which authorize contribution in cases of negligence actions for personal injury or property damage.
Some of these statutes have been expressly worded or so interpreted as to
abrogate completely the common law prohibition in this type of case and permit
contribution whenever prayed for. 3 But the decisions of each court must rest
necessarily upon the particular statute in its jurisdiction. The New York
statute in both form and content is practically identical with that of Michigan. 4
The New York court5 adopted the view that the substantive right of contribution
arises only after a joint judgment has been recovered and therefore a defendant
can have no right to implead a third party on the basis that he is or may be
liable6 to defendant because, according to the express words of the statute, he
can not be liable unless a joint judgment is recovered. Until that time defendant has no substantive right of contribution. The logic of the court's argument
is irrefutable. Of the many critics of the New York position, only one has
questioned the court's interpretation,7 the rest simply urging that this unfortunate law be changed.8 Only in one jurisdiction, Texas, with a contribu2 See Brown v. Cranston, (2d Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 631, affd. 2 F.R.D. 270 (1942),
cert. den. 319 U.S. 741, 63 S.Ct. 1028 (1942) upon which the court in the principal case
relied and wherein are collected the leading New York decisions in the field.
s 1 N.C. Gen. Laws (Michie, 1943) §1-240; 12 Pa. Ann. Stat. (Purdon, 1951) §2081;
Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., (3d Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 967, affd. 340 U.S. 543, 71 S.Ct.
399 (1951); Wis. Stat. Ann. (1951) §260.19(3); Bakula v. Schwab, 167 Wis. 546, 168
N.W. 378 (1918).
4 N.Y. Civil Practice Act (1946) §211-a. " ••• Where a money judgment has been
recovered jointly against two or more defendants in an action for a personal injury or for
property damage, and such judgment has been paid in full by one or more of such defendants, each defendant who has paid more than his pro rata share shall be entitled to contribution from the other defendants. • • ."
Ii Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931).
6 Id. at 308. The court concluded that the New York Impleader Statute which authorizes impleader of a third party who is or may be liable to defendant was of no help to
defendant in that case because liability could be predicated only on a joint judgment.
7 Bennett, "Bringing in Third Parties by Defendant," 19 MINN. L. REv. 163 at 180,
181 (1935). Professor Bennett admitted that the decision was technically unimpeachable
at page 182.
s 1 MoolUl, FEDERAL PRAcnCE 773 (1938); Gregory, ''Tort Contribution Practice in
New York,'' 20 CoRN. L.Q. 269 (1935); GRilGORY, LEGISLAnvll Loss llisTRillUTION IN
NEGLIGENCE AcnoNs (1936). In this book Mr. Gregory says of Professor Bennett: "How
Professor Bennett can believe that the Court of Appeals' interpretation is unfortunate is
hard to understand. Why the court should have pulled the legislature's half baked chestnut
out of the fire is difficult to see." At page 29, n. 29.
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tion statute9 which authorizes recovery after joint judgment has the court concluded that this gives the defendant a right to implead a third party. The
Texas court in Lottman v. Cuilla10 concluded that the spirit of their law is to
abrogate completely the common law prohibition. They admitted that literally
the statute applies only to judgments rendered against two or more defendants
but considered that complete abrogation must have been the intent of the legislature. Since this fust Texas decision, no further question seems to have been
raised in regard to the validity of its interpretation. In the absence of the
Texas decision it would be easy to conclude that the Michigan Supreme Court
will reach the same decision as did the federal district court in the principal case.
Its presence, however, casts the shadow of a doubt The writer is inclined to
believe, in spite of this, that the Michigan Supreme Court will conclude that
the contribution statute does not give defendant a right to implead, because the
correctness of this decision is urged by most of the authorities in the field,11 and
because of the policy of the Michigan courts as well as those of most states to
interpret statutes in derogation of the common law strictly.12 The Texas courts
apparently do not follow this rule and in fact in this situation have allowed
their ideas of justice and fair play rather than the express language of the statute
to influence their judgment as to the intention of the legislature.
If the view is accepted that the Michigan Contribution Statute does not give
a right of impleader to a defendant, should the matter be allowed to rest there? 13
It is submitted that the conclusion reached by the Texas court is more desirable
as a matter of justice and that the statute should be changed. A suggested
amendment would be to change the present section 2 to section 3 and insert the
following as section 2: "Section 2. The Defendant may, however, implead
a third party who may be liable to him if a joint judgment is recovered against
them in order that such joint judgment may be recovered." An amendment in
this form will avoid the possibility of subsequent litigation to establish the liability of a third party to defendant since the right to contribution will still rest upon
the recovery of a joint judgment
W. J. Roper

9 7 Tex. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, Civil Statutes, 1950) art. 2212. "Any person against
whom, with one or more others, a judgment is rendered in any suit on an action arising
out of, or based on tort • • • shall, upon payment of said judgment, have a right of action
against his co-defendant or co-defendants. • ••"
10 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926) 288 S.W. 123.
11 Supra note 8.
12 Principal case at 281.
13 As to the relative merits of allowing plaintiff or defendant to decide who shall be
party defendant to a suit, compare James and Gregory, "Contnoution Among Tortfeasors,"
54 HARV. L. REv. 1156 at 1178, 1184 (1941).

